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Signing books for military in Afghanistan

Bette Dam is known for her excellent knowledge on Afghanistan and the effects of the military invasion in that country. Since 2006 she is visiting Uruzgan (and other Afghan areas) regularly and is the author of ‘Expeditie Uruzgan: De weg van Hamid Karzai naar het paleis’ (Expedition Uruzgan: Hamid Karzai’s way into the Palace‘), Amsterdam and Antwerpen, 2009 (in Dutch). The book has been nominated twice in The Netherlands. Dam produces for Radio Netherlands and Vrij Nederland (national magazine). She has been quoted by BBC, Financial Times, Sydney Morning Herald. Dam is guest blogger at the renowned think tank in Kabul The Afghanistan Analayst network (www.aan-afghanistan.org) 

Before 2006 she worked in the Middle East. Dam started her career as a political correspondent for a national press agency.

Follow her on Twitter www.twitter.nl/BetteDam

Bette Dam on Afghanistan - articles collected here: http://www.rnw.nl/english/category/tags-english/bette-dam

Book her at the Speakers Academy for lectures. www.speakersacademy.nl/speakers/bette-dam

For all information and commissions contact my agent Maartje Wildeman maartjewildeman@chello.nl , 020-626 78 29

The 102 interpreters who have assisted the Dutch military mission in Afghanistan are angry. Although they have risked their lives for the country, the Netherlands has abandoned them. The Americans, by comparison, are allowing their interpreters and translators to apply for visas to travel to the United States.

http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/dutch-military-abandon-afghan-helpers 

On our way to Deh Rawod, hometown of Mullah Berader

02-06-10 The article below came to my mind, following the peace jirga in Kabul. Where is Mullah Barader? 

Feb 2010, Radio Netherlands, Bette Dam: The Afghan authorities confirmed on Tuesday reports that the Taliban’s second-in-command, Mullah Baradar, has been arrested in Pakistan. But while the West considers the capture of such a ‘big fish’ a strategic victory, our correspondent points out that he was also the key to a possible diplomatic solution to the conflict.

Less than two months ago three Afghans accompanied me on a secret mission to Deh Rawod, Uruzgan’s second largest town. We set out in two old Toyotas without revealing our plans to anyone and without speaking about the trip on the phone. Treachery is everywhere in this country. The only people who knew of our journey were relatives who could offer us shelter along the way.

My Afghan driver was flustered when he began talking about the Taliban leader Mullah Baradar. We had taken every precaution and the second car travelled behind us. We let other vehicles travel in front of us before entering Deh Rawod in order to avoid roadside bombs.

Members of the same tribe
My Afghan colleague asked: “Do you know that you are about to ask some very troublesome questions?” I knew they were quite awkward. I was attempting to discover more about the secret relationship between the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Taliban’s operational leader. It is a story which began in Deh Rawod.

President Karzai’s closest allies live in the shadow of the Dutch Camp Hadrian. Mullah Baradar knows them all. Both leaders belong to the same tribe, the Popolzai.

Saved his life
President Karzai started to ask for Mullah Baradar's help in 2001. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Americans helped Karzai take control of ‘his’ region in Uruzgan from the Taliban. By talking and negotiating he convinced one tribal leader after another to support him.

When Karzai found himself in a life-threatening situation while in the Durji mountains he was rescued by Mullah Baradar, who was then the Taliban’s defence minister. In exchange, Karzai agreed not to punish Mullah Baradar for his role as a Taliban leader. Karzai assured him that he had nothing to worry about and that the Taliban would later be allowed to participate in the government. However things turned out differently. United States forces bombed Baradar’s house in Deh Rawod in spite of Karzai’s objections. Mullah Baradar fled the country and began operating in neighbouring Pakistan.

Powerful network
In Deh Rawod, our hosts closed the doors before we started talking. Everyone knew that Mullah Baradar was still on the West’s most-wanted list and associating with the Taliban is dangerous. However when I mentioned that I had spoken to President Karzai about his relationship with Mullah Baradar, our hosts lost their reservations. They explained that President Karzai’s influence is still strong here. And the same holds true for Mullah Baradar.

I had already heard in Kabul that there was contact between the two sides. Here, tribal contacts are more important than ideology. The Popolzai are more loyal to their own tribe than they are to the regime in Kabul or to the Taliban. One of my hosts told me that Mullah Baradar had been in Deh Rawod three months earlier thanks to the support of the Karzai network. When I attempted to dig deeper the man stopped talking, saying he had to go to a wedding and left.

Travelling in Afghanistan
One tribal leader from the region told me that Mullah Baradar travelled freely in Afghanistan. He passed Canadian and Dutch soldiers while travelling in an old car between the Pakistan border and his native town. He did this by ensuring that members of his tribe and people loyal to him would secure his safe passage as he made the trips.
 
After my return to Kabul I heard that after a visit to Deh Rawod, Mullah Baradar travelled to Kabul for talks with President Karzai. Informed sources in Kabul told me that Mullah Baradar would be the best-placed person to help the government with its plans to reach a peaceful agreement with the Taliban. President Karzai’s contacts with Mullah Baradar would enable him to reach the inner circles of the Taliban leadership.
 
Gain or loss?
Sources within Western intelligence agencies say that Mullah Baradar was previously in Dubai for talks. Others say that President Karzai sometimes ensured that Mullah Baradar was able to cross the border, while the mullah at times did the president a favour.

This morning I was awoken by a phone call informing me that Mullah Baradar had been arrested. Many analysts consider this positive news. This will weaken the Taliban and is clearly a military success. However this is a short-term gain. But what does it mean for Kabul’s ambitious plans to reach a peace agreement with the Taliban? After all, wasn’t Mullah Baradar the key to peace in Afghanistan?

http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/mullah-baradar-friend-or-foe

Just have a look on http://twitter.com/BetteDam on English and Dutch articles on the Dutch mission in Uruzgan. What will be the effect for Afghans now Dutch government collapsed and as a consequence, the troops will leave the province?

Beheaded by the Taleban? No, this time it was about sex

 

http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=561 

In Afghanistan, things are often more complicated than they look like at the first glance. Some armed fighting, for example, is motivated by local conflicts. But there are always people who are interested to present this as ‘Taleban’-driven. Our guest author BETTE DAM*, a Dutch journalist, pleads for more accuracy in reporting such incidents.

On New Year’s Day, six Afghans were beheaded in a village in Uruzgan province. Horrible news. The boys were young, some of them only 18 years old.

The New York Times was quick with the conclusion: the Taleban were behind it. They killed the men ‘because of their alliance with the Karzai government’. AFP told their readers they were killed ‘by the Taleban’, because of ‘spying’ for the Afghan government. Xinhua made it even more clear: the six beheaded Afghans were ‘ex-colleges’ from the Taleban who killed them. A Belgian newspaper presented the story like this: ‘A group of moderate Taleban held a meeting in a house and a terrorist Taleban-group came and beheaded them’, as provincial police commander Juma Gul told the journalist.

My first text message to an Afghan I work with in Tarinkot about what happened with the six victims was answered with: ‘Those people were madrassa Taleban’. For me that didn't explain anything; my experience is that you have to press a bit. Often the conflicts in the province seem too complex for the Afghans to take the effort to explain them to Westerners. Others find it much easier to blame the Taleban for everything and get away with it. Besides that, especially the young Afghans I work with feel sometimes ashamed to speak about differences between their tribal leaders.

But I've been working with this Afghan colleague for two years and I know I can try it again. So I did. ‘But who was interested in killing them?’, I texted, in the hope to get names of tribal leaders who had an enmity between each other, or maybe something else. And again I got an unclear answer: ‘The Taleban killed among each other’. I felt something uncommon was going on; most of the time he is more direct. So I tried ‘Why did they do that then? Is it rivalry between groups? Were the two groups both from Tarinkot?’ It took a while… and then he replied that he talked to the leader of the jail who arrested four of the killers, and he told him the reason: ‘To be honest - they fought about a boy friend’.

After talking to the governor and an aid worker in Tarinkot I got it confirmed. The fights for sex with a boy ended up in the newspaper as a clash between Taleban ‘who become more strong in the province’, as one newspaper added.

The governor was clear: ‘No, it’s not extremist Taleban, they were not fighters, just students. We are researching it’, he said, ‘but yes, the idea is that it was about a boyfriend’.

The aid worker started laughing uncomfortable when I asked him the same question. ‘How can I explain to you what happened’, he tried. ‘Is it a Taleban-fight? ’, I asked. He quickly denied. ‘No fighters, no Taleban, it has nothing to do with that.’ Then he found how to put it: ‘Here we have a habit of... they fought about misusing a boy for love’.

So, what happened according to my sources, was as follows: In a village ten kilometer west of Tarinkot, the fight started amongst three small madrassas. Two of them, the governor explained, are for adults. The other one is for boys under 18. Two adult groups wanted to take a ‘boyfriend’ from the children’s madrassa but a disagreement started between them. In the night, one adult group attacked the other adult group. They first killed their targets (some of them were sleeping, others were studying) and after that they beheaded them. ‘For Tarinkot, this is also very unusual”, the aid worker said.

It is the second time in a few weeks that media write about 'Taleban' responsible for certain killings while there seems to be a different reality. The latest suicide attack in Dehrawod in November – where 13 people got killed (see our blog about this incident here) - was also about two local groups who had a rivalry amongst each other for years now.

Especially these days, when thousands of American soldiers prepare themselves for ‘war’ in Afghanistan, it is important for the media to take the lead and ask the question: What is really going on in Afghanistan? Is there ‘increasing Taleban influence’ and where? What is the real background of local conflicts? Who exactly is the enemy the soldiers are going to fight? At the same time it is not sufficient to use Afghanistan’s complexity as a pretext for superficial reporting: As it is shown here, the background of incidents like the one in the Tarinkot madrassa can be discovered relatively easily, with a bit of patience and leaving behind the black-and-white picture about the Taleban. This way, the public gets to know what Afghanistan really is about and what the soldiers stand for when they depart to the country any time soon.

* Bette Dam is a freelance journalist based in the Netherlands, traveling regularly to Afghanistan, in particular to Uruzgan. She is the author of the book ‘Expeditie Uruzgan: De weg van Hamid Karzai naar het paleis’ (Expedition Uruzgan: Hamid Karzai’s way into his palace, Arbeiderspers, Amsterdam and Antwerpen 2009).

Bette Dam is in Amsterdam right now (Jan 30 2010)

You can reach her at bettedam@gmail.com

EXPEDITION URUZGAN: the Road of Hamid Karzai to the Palace by Bette Dam

Tpb, 220pp. Journalistic non-fiction. Bette Dam tells the story of a rather unknown Afghan who – after 09/11-  took two satellite phones, organized a group of close tribal leaders crossed the border on a motor cycle and tried to free Afghanistan from his rivals: The Taliban. They way this man - Hamid Karzai - organized his tribal rebellion by leaving the weapons behind and talking his way through the South with the help of USSpecial Forces, is a lesson for the today decision makers on how to deal with this complex country.

Dam interviewed more then 60 eyewitnesses of these historic events: the proud relatives of Karzai, the American special forces, the Taliban members, as well as diplomats and experts on Afghanistan. She spent hours talking to the President about his role in the turbulent months following the events of 9/11, what his ambitions were, what he wanted to be as a leader and how he thinks Afghanistan works.

The result is not only an exciting reconstruction about an ordinary Afghan who becomes the president. It’s much more then that. By following his road to the palace people get to know the power sharing game in this complex network of the tribal society. For the first time so many Afghans tell openly about how they survive in this environment, how they see amnesty, reconciliation, deal makings and when they use their weapons. With sometimes the sphere of the Kiterunner, Afghans are explaining their story, how they see the world, how they act and why.  After publishing the book, ministers, generals of the army and the directors of NGO’s – eager to find a solution for Afghanistan - all invited Dam to talk about her findings in this complex world that is called Afghanistan (The Dutch are participating in ISAF in the Southern province Uruzgan). Especially now, at a time decision makers try to rethink their strategy  about a country that is becoming more dangerous, year after year, they use this book to understand the Afghans.

Bette Dam (1979) is a freelance journalist and political analyst. Besides her stays in Afghanistan. she reported from  Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon. . Website (in English): http://www.bettedam.eu

Quotes:

BBC World

"What happened in Afghanistan in 2001 still matters today. Bette Dam was determined to find out what really happened." Lyse Doucet, BBC

“A must have for all military”, until 2008 chief of Defense staff Dutch Army, Dick Berlijn.

Leading newspaper in Holland, NRC Handelsblad:

“Dam showed a great insight in the power of shared history in Afganistan”

Leading newspaper in Belgium, De Standaard:

“Dam shows why Hamid Karzai takes decisions that frustrate diplomats... Everybody who wants to understand Afghansitan, should read this.”

Dam quotes in the Sydney Herald Tribune:

http://www.smh.com.au/world/doing-the-bidding-of-organised-crime-20090821-ett6.html

Book reveals CIA role in 2001 uprising in southern Afghanistan

http://blogs.rnw.nl/vredeenveiligheid/?ibegin_share_action=get_content&id=1525

Goede recensie http://archief.nrc.nl/?modus=l

" ..Dit boek helpt begrijpen waarom de provincie bijna niet onder centraal gezag te brengen is, en doet vrezen dat de Nederlanders er hooguit een officiële schaduwregering in het zadel kunnen helpen." 

" Bette Dam heeft iets gepresteerd wat maar weinig collega’s kunnen of durven." 

Lees de recensie: http://extra.volkskrant.nl/select/boeken/artikel.php?id=1332

In Dutch..

08-08-09

Wat is de toekomst van Afghanistan nu NAVO-landen steeds pessimistischer lijken te worden over de mogelijkheden in dat land. In de NOVA-studio leg ik in het verlengde van mijn boek - waar ik de machtswisseling van de Taliban naar Karzai beschrijf aan de hand van Afghaanse getuigen - hoe ik het zie. De manier waarop Karzai aan de macht is gekomen in 2001 leerde mij een hoop over het nu. Wat zijn de spelers, waar wonen ze, hoe denken ze? Hoe ziet een dorp qua samenstelling er uit en wat zijn daar de krachten voor en tegen? En hoe snel verandert dat en waarom? De Taliban komen voort uit die dorpen, maar wie zijn ze? Wat drijft ze? En wat creeert nou zoveel onrust en in hoeverre staan de internationale troepen in het verlengde van het Afghaanse denken? 

http://www.novatv.nl/page/detail/uitzendingen/7226/

Oruzgan (Uruzgan) is the ''laboratory province" , see the conclusion of journalist Paul McGeough. 

http://www.smh.com.au/world/doing-the-bidding-of-organised-crime-20090821-ett6.html

...The Taliban have a knack of reaching out to tribes that are of local substance, but have been marginalised by the likes of Karzai's Popalzai. Jan made Oruzgan fertile ground, creating a whole marginalised class who were motivated more by the loss of tribal honour than any Islamist or anti-Western ideology.

"In this environment,'' Dam says, ''the Taliban is very good at responding to grievances and capitalising on them. They provide an umbrella and resources for those who want to fight back. And when Jan defines his enemies as Taliban and tells the Americans that they are, the problem is that a lot of them become Taliban."

Her point is: if the likes of Jan are not exploiting his position - he is no longer governor, but he continues to be a powerful local presence - then the Taliban cannot make a purchase.

There is not much to fight over in Oruzgan. It is not of great interest to the Government or to the Taliban, which "means there is potential to make Oruzgan right'', she says.

"But the government is the biggest obstacle to solving local problems so that people might lay down their weapons. It's local government and its close links to Karzai that allows them to maintain this little war,'' Dam says. ''The people read the signals when they are bypassed in every local appointment - so they keep fighting.

add: For me, Uruzgan was a vehicle to get to know post 2001-Afghanistan in a way. It took some time to learn about the tribal dynamics, but it was worth it. The reasons behind the insurgency can become more clear by understanding the Uruzgan-dossier. This Australian newspaper tried to get a grip on the dynamics by talking to experts. I am quoted as well. Have a look. Tried to nuance the position of Jan Mohammed when I was interviewed for this article or tried to put it into more context of understanding why he became a leader of exclusion, power-seeking.  That is important to understand. Talked several times to Jan Mohammed and you have to see him in the tribal context of Uruzgan. Jan Mohammed and his network of families and tribes (including Karzai) were the leaders before the Taliban came. That was in 1994. Then his rivals who were excluded from power took the lead until 2001.  They tried to work together but it didnt work out. Jan Mohammed then sought US support in Pakistan against his rivals in the Taliban-regime but that failed and he was put in jail. That was in 2000. So, imagine what happend when this Jan Mohammed who became a warrior during the Sovjet-war in Afghanistan by using weapons provided by Pakistan (from US, SA, Egypt etc etc) became governor in 2001 when Karzai became president. Rivalry, revanche, concepts of the way Afghans act traditionally, became leading. That mixed with a new face - meaning US help of Special Forces who followed him in who is the enemy and who is not- created the fundament of how the conflict developed in Uruzgan. And in a way also in other southern provinces (not visited all, so i am careful for generalization).

Polak

Een ontzettend prettig gesprek met Clairy Polak in NOVA. De kleine studio was heerlijk rustig en had een goede atmosfeer voor een interview. Wereldomroep-collega Hans Jaap Melissen stond in Kabul en werd live de uitzending ingehaald. Daarna begonnen wij over het land, Karzai en mijn boek. Vooral het ongedwongen gesprek was iets waar veel kijkers - die naderhand via de sms massaal reageerden -enthousiast over waren. Kijkt u zelf.

http://www.novatv.nl/page/detail/uitzendingen/7184/Dag+voor+verkiezingen+opnieuw+geweld+in+Kabul/

Modetijdschrift Glamour ...

werkt aan een top-tien van vrouwen die het debat bepalen. Ik sta naast Agnes Kant, publiciste Stine Jensen en advocate Mirjam de Belcourt.

Gisteren kreeg ik de felicitaties van de VIVA.. Deze week (vanaf 31 juli) sta ik in het blad met mijn boek maar eind oktober publiceren ze de Top 400 met meest invloedrijke, stoere etc vrouwen. Ik sta onder het kopje 'stoer'...

Vorig jaar presenteerde minister Plasterk de lijst, wie het dit jaar gaat doen is nog niet duidelijk...

http://www.viva.nl/2008/07/08/wie-zijn-die-succesvolle-vrouwen/

"Een lijst met - in willekeurige volgorde - de meest succesvolle, rijke, slimme, creatieve, beste, zakelijke, aanstormende en stoere vrouwen onder de 37 jaar in Nederland."

http://www.dutchcowgirls.nl/offline/607

29-07, Amsterdam. Niemand minder dan Joris Luyendijk is bij mijn boekpresentatie aanwezig (volg week donderdag). En dat is een hele eer. Luyendijks werk is en blijft de inspiratie voor kritische journalisten die proberen werk te maken van wat er echt speelt, die nee durven zeggen tegen hoofdredacties, die door hun eigen netwerk langzaam losweken van persbureaus en woordvoerders.

Luyendijk heeft aangeboden mij on the spot in het hart van de uitgeverij te interviewen, waar al mijn zo welkome gasten omheen staan. Familie, vrienden, maar ook anderen die betrokken waren of zijn bij de totstandkoming van het boek en die ik graag zou willen vertellen over wat ik heb gedaan. Een mini-zomergasten lijkt het wel en ik had me geen betere voorstelling kunnen maken van de launch van het boek.

Even was hij in Nederland, de gouverneur van Uruzgan, Asadullah Hamdam. Een avondje bracht hij door met oud-collega's van Defensie en een avondje met zijn familie op een bruiloft in Oost-Brabant, waar ik hem ook op zocht.

http://www.wereldomroep.nl/actua/nl/uruzgan_taliban

http://blogs.rnw.nl/vredeenveiligheid/2009/04/21/uruzgan-slechts-50-geweld-toe-te-schrijven-aan-de-taliban/

en het anp: http://www.depers.nl/buitenland/301710/Hamdam-praat-dagelijks-met-Taliban.html

en BNR: http://www.bnr.nl/static/jspx/play.jspx?datum=22/04/2009&tijd=08:25:28&lengte=15&titel=Titel

in English:

http://www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/region/asiapacific/090421-Uruzgan-Hamdam

In arabic:

http://www.rnw.nl/hunaamsterdam/specialfiles/240309/240309/210409

Journalisten Gijs Wanders, Patrick Lodiers & Bette Dam vergelijken hun ervaringen in Uruzgan in Met het Oog op Morgen, Radio 1

luister bij Beeld en Geluid:

http://www.nos.nl/nosjournaal/artikelen/2009/4/11/index_av.html

item staat op 23:43

Luister live gesprek met BNR Nieuws Radio

http://www.bnr.nl/static/jspx/play.jspx?datum=07/04/2009&tijd=17:08:00&lengte=15&titel=Titel

door Bette Dam in Den Haag
 
Met de presentatie van een korte slotverklaring aan het eind van de Afghanistan Conferentie in Den Haag, probeerden zo'n zeventig leiders een nieuw hoofdstuk in te slaan.

http://www.wereldomroep.nl/actua/dossier/afghanistan-conferentie-den-haag/afghanistanconferentie_slot

The optimistic atmosphere was palpable amongst the 72 representatives seated at the long table which was the focal point of the Afghanistan Conference. One speaker after another echoed the words of US President Barack Obama and called for an integrated strategy.

http://www.radionetherlands.nl/afghanistanconference/conference-hague090331

Inhabitants of the Afghan town of Tarin Kowt will be able to follow the conference on their country, taking place in The Hague today, live on television.

http://www.radionetherlands.nl/afghanistanconference/090331-Hague-Tarin-Kowt

One of the sub-themes of the Afghanistan Conference in The Hague is the issue of a 'comprehensive approach'. This means using military power, diplomatic activities, and development aid in a coordinated manner.

Our reporter Bette Dam came across a typical example of this comprehensive approach in the province of Uruzgan, where the Netherlands is leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

http://www.radionetherlands.nl/afghanistanconference/090328-afghanistan-isaf

INTERVIEW AFGHAN MEDIATOR

"I had no Guarantee the sons would not fight"

When 800 soldiers participating in operation Tura Ghar entered the dangerous Baluchi valley in January, an Afghan mediator was waiting anxiously. Backed by diplomats based at Camp Holland, he had tried to persuade the Afghan militants to stop fighting. He appears to have succeeded. "Trust tribal leaders and mediators like me."

http://www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/region/asiapacific/090328-baluchi-afghanistan

Wie was Rozi Khan?

September 19th, 2008

De Nederlandse freelance-journaliste Bette Dam schrijft momenteel een boek over Uruzgan. Toen zij donderdag het nieuws hoorde over de dood van Rozi Khan was ze juist bezig een bandje met een van haar interviews met hem te beluisteren. Exclusief voor het blog ‘Vrede en Veiligheid’ schreef Bette Dam een reactie op de dramatische gebeurtenissen donderdag net buiten Tarin Kowt.